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Abstract | Of the total casualties from the two atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki, almost ten percent were ethnic Koreans who had migrated or been 
mobilized to Japan under colonial rule. Following the General Headquarters of the 
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers’ (GHQ/SCAP) repatriation policy vis-à-vis 
the non-Japanese, tens of thousands of Korean atomic bomb survivors hastily returned 
to Korea. In the divided peninsula, one of the key sites of Cold War politics in the Far 
East, their voices were intentionally and unintentionally silenced by the military 
dictatorships, as well as by social ignorance. Nevertheless, their desperate struggles 
continued with the support from Japanese civic groups. After several decades of legal 
proceedings in Japan, they became eligible for financial and medical support from the 
Japanese government in 2003, once they successfully obtained a Hibakusha Techō—a 
certificate that recognizes a person as having been exposed to the atomic bombs. 
Acquiring of a Japanese Hibakusha Techō involves complicated paperwork, including 
the assembling of verified testimonies and official documents that can confirm the 
applicant’s presence in the bombed area at the time of bombing. Unlike in Japan, where 
public memories and knowledge of the atomic bombings are widely acknowledged, in 
Korea, records, memories, and information regarding the atomic bombings are stored 
exclusively within family networks and the organizations of the survivors. By 
emphasizing the socio-cultural embeddedness, particularly within the interpersonal 
networks of family and local communities, this study indicates that Korean survivors’ 
exclusion from Japan’s relief policies is due to both bureaucratic red tape and socio-
cultural practices. In particular, these bureaucratic procedures are structured to exclude 
the socio-culturally weak and alienated, such as orphans, former forced draftees, and 
women isolated from family networks.
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Introduction 
Records show that ten percent of the total victims from the two atomic bombs 
dropped on Hiroshima and Nakagsaki were Koreans (Hiroshima-shi-Nagasaki-
shi Genbaku Saigai-shi Henshū Iinkai 2005; Han’guk Wŏnp’ok P’ihaeja Hyŏphoe 
1985). Yet not much has been revealed about the records and memories of these 
Korean victims—not in Korea, which was liberated by these atomic bombs, or in 
Japan, which declared itself as “the only country to have suffered atomic 
bombs,” or in the US, which claimed to have shortened the war and saved 
thousands of American and Japanese lives. Today, Japan’s government and 
judicial authorities, including the district court and local government in 
Nagasaki, are one of the few places where the records and memories of the 
atomic bomb victims from colonial Korea continue to carry weight. This is not 
because the Japanese local authorities are concerned with diplomatic conflicts or 
historical friction that could arise from this issue; rather, it has more to do with 
administrative and bureaucratic procedures for evaluating those who claim to 
be the victims of the atomic bombings—or the hibakusha. Today, most of the 
surviving Korean victims of the atomic bombings reside in Korea, yet their 
experiences and memories are rarely discussed, nor are they acknowledged in 
Korea’s official history. They resurface only when the victims undergo 
administrative procedures in order to acquire Hibakusha Techō—a local 
government-issued “legal authorization of the individual’s experience as a victim 
of atomic bombing” (Yoneyama 1999, 93). 
Existing literature that deals with the issue of Korean hibakusha has focused 
only on field surveys of the victims or the diplomatic and political negotiations 
between the Korean and Japanese governments on the issue of reparation.1 This 
study pays particular attention to the development of relief measure policies for 
the atomic bomb hibakusha in Japan, while using ethnographic text to 
understand Korean survivors’ process of attaining atomic bomb hibakusha 
status. It sheds light on how the experiences of Korean victims were 
reinterpreted and bounded within the administrative-bureaucratic procedure of 
1. Most academic research conducted in Korea on Korean atomic bomb survivors are reports of 
field surveys. In social sciences, a few studies recorded the interviews of survivors residing mostly 
in Chŏlla Province and analyzed the social context of these testimonies (Chin Chu 2004; Chŏng 
Kŭn-sik 2005). Others have focused on the meaning entailed in the court cases filed by Korean 
survivors within the context of Korea-Japan diplomatic negotiations and history reconciliation (Yi 
Chi-yŏng 2012; Kim Sŭng-ŭn 2012a, 2012b). In addition, some studies (Naono 2003; Kwŏn Hyŏk-
t’ae 2009; Pak Kyŏng-sŏp 2009) shed light on the positions of the Korean survivors  in the domain 
of “politics of memory” (Yoneyama 1999), though they did not focus exclusively on Korean 
survivors. 
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acquiring Hibakusha Techō—a process often neglected as a simplistic and 
formalized perception toward bureaucracy. 
The data for this study was acquired during pre-survey discussions conducted 
in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 2007 for a period of two months, as well as from 
a field survey based mainly on the Korea Atomic Bombs Victim Association 
(KABVA) in 2008 and 2011. During the field surveys, I analyzed a variety of 
official documents and membership cards stored at KABVA, and conducted 
both official and unofficial interviews with the members. In addition, I have 
used other sources, including unofficial interviews conducted in Japan and 
Korea, email messages exchanged with the members of civil groups in Japan, 
testimonies of Korean hibakusha, periodical and non-periodical subscriptions 
published by Japan’s civic groups, and conference minutes from the Japanese 
Diet.
Policy and Bureaucracy as Ethnographic Text
Academic analyses of state institutions and policies have been vital to the fields 
of policy and public administration studies, as well as political science. For these 
approaches, policies are defined as administrative arrangements implemented 
by the government for the purpose of resolving public and social problems 
(Chŏng Chŏng-gil 1997, 51). In anthropology, however, the meaning of policy 
goes beyond this limited definition. Shore and Wright (1997) argue that policies 
are not mere administrative tools for the state or the government; instead, they 
must be understood as a type of immense knowledge system. Policies are ways 
of defining behaviors that create socially- and individually-accepted norms, 
ideologies, behavioral and conceptual customs, as well as the methods and 
technologies that reify them. In modern states, policies not only construct the 
framework for appropriate behavior, they also provide a wider range of 
purposes and principles, as they function as authorizing apparatuses for the 
decisions reached through these procedures. 
Anthropological studies on policies inherit the tradition of political 
anthropology in that they focus on the study of the state, yet here “state” is not 
defined by the a priori concept employed by political economists. Sharma and 
Gupta (2006) once pointed out that anthropologists should abandon the 
conception of the state as a fixed and monolithic entity and instead focus on its 
ideological and material aspects. This reveals how it deviates from other 
institutional structures and how it affects the functions and expansion of 
authority within the society. In that sense, rather than accepting the state as 
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monolithic and relatively autonomous social structure, we must conceptualize it 
as the construction and embodiment of day-to-day social practices (Sharma and 
Gupta 2006, 9).
The method of conceptualizing the state as public text and understanding 
the institutions and policies of a specific government within daily practices is 
common in the studies of bureaucracy (Hull 2008, 2012; Heyman 2012; Deeb 
and Marcus 2011; Gupta 2012; Riles 2008; Das 2006). Bureaucracy is often 
described as the governing or ruling apparatus of modern states, and according 
to Weber’s definition of the ideal type, its authority derives its power from legal 
and rational decision making processes rather than from charisma, tradition, or 
succession. Its operation is based on a rational and impersonal calculation of 
interests (Weber 1991). On the other hand, Weber argued that, in reality, day-to-
day operation of bureaucracy comes about by creating and sustaining the 
separation between socioeconomic and social orders, as well as public and 
private spheres. Furthermore, he argued that the understanding of 
bureaucratization or bureaucratic rationalization as an embodied social 
phenomenon of capitalistic modernity should not be restrained to the realm of 
state affairs but must be applied to every aspect of modern society. By extending 
bureaucratic institutions and procedures to all social spheres, its functions 
become important, modern instrument to appease civil disobedience and 
legitimatize the order set up to prevent social changes. 
The shared interests among recent ethnographical studies on the operation 
of bureaucracy can be interpreted in line with Weber’s observation of 
bureaucracy (Hull 2008, 2012; Göpfert 2013; Feldman 2008; Lavie 2012; Kravel-
Tovi 2012; Gupta 2012). Public service in modern society operates on the basis 
of written documents, rather than on interpersonal exchange. Weber explained 
that the collective body of clerical workers constitutes a passive bureaucracy that 
engages in public services based on document compilation and management of 
these files (Weber 1978, 957, quoted in Hull 2012, 11). 
On the other hand, what recent studies call the “states’ bureaucratic 
administrations,” comprised of bureaucracies, documental agents, and their 
operations, must be understood not simply as public and objective entities. They 
are also a constitutive substance of a society within which these institutions are 
founded upon material bases (Heyman 2012, 1270). Bureaucratic governance is 
itself a construction of social relations based on unique social, cultural, and 
linguistic spheres, yet at the same time it shares mutually constitutive elements 
with society, politics, and science. What Long (1992) characterized as “interface” 
is a point of intersection between states, science—or more broadly, knowledge—
and civil society (quoted in Heyman 2012, 1270). In that sense, earlier 
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anthropological approaches toward states through the analyses of policies 
focused too heavily on knowledge accumulation and discourse analyses, yet 
these research efforts must be complementary with the newly rising trends that 
shed light on the document-based practices of bureaucracy. By following the 
process through which a specific problem becomes socially acknowledged and 
institutionalized, and then bureaucratically handled, state authority becomes 
one of “anthropologically-diagnosable diverse locus and texts” (Trouillot 2003).
In this context, this study regards the formation of the policy field vis-à-vis 
the victims of atomic bombings and the issuance process of Hibakusha Techō as 
one ethnographic text. The process through which Korean victims of atomic 
bombings acquire Hibakusha Techō is an administrative-bureaucratic procedure 
that reflects the history of Korean atomic bomb survivors. At the same time, 
preparing application documents and going through the screening process in 
Japan is also a process of reconstructing their individual historical experiences 
as hibakusha by recording personal memories that are rarely discussed in 
Korean society. The first half of this study sheds light on the formation process 
of such administrative-bureaucratic procedures, and considers their historical 
meaning within the history of Japan’s postwar compensation. In the following 
section, I will evaluate the history of Korean atomic bomb survivors, whose 
experiences vacillated between Japan’s national discourse of victimization and 
Korea’s lack of official recognition regarding their struggles. In doing so, rather 
than focusing on comparative discourse analyses, I will illuminate how these 
experiences are ingrained in the bureaucratic documents and elucidate the 
constructive and exclusive aspects of these bureaucratic procedures. 
Drawing National Borders on Relief Measures for Japanese 
Hibakusha and Bureaucratic Reterritorialization 
In 1957, twelve years after the dropping of the atomic bombs, the Japanese 
government enacted the Act on Medical Care for Atomic Bomb Hibakusha, 
which became the basis for relief policies for Japanese hibakusha. However, this 
law was not designed to provide government compensation; rather, it was 
introduced for the purpose of maintaining public health and welfare. The 
government’s decision to contain the victims’ demand for compensation within 
medical care-related social welfare policy was met by severe opposition, and the 
proposed plans for medical treatment was also criticized for its inadequacy. The 
1963 Tokyo District Court ruling urged the state to take appropriate measures 
for the aid of hibakusha, as “the severity of the damages inflicted upon the 
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atomic bomb survivors is incomparable to what was caused by ordinary warfare.” 
Following this court order, the government enacted the complementary Act on 
Special Measures for Atomic Bomb Hibakusha in 1968, which, along with the 
1957 Medical Care Act for Atomic Bomb Hibakusha, became the basis for relief 
policies for the Japanese hibakusha. In 1994, the two legislations were integrated 
into the Act on Relief for Atomic Bomb Hibakusha.
On the other hand, the intricacy of this politically sensitive matter went 
beyond Japan’s domestic realm. The complexity of the issue became apparent in 
the post-colonial relations between Japan and its former subjects, who no longer 
possessed Japanese nationality or resided in Japanese territory. Although the 
victims of the atomic bombings held the government accountable for their 
injuries, by introducing the Medical Care Act for Atomic Bomb Hibakusha, the 
government attempted to reduce its responsibility to the domain of public 
health and welfare. Paradoxically, such circumvention of responsibility and 
compensation led to the implementation of related welfare policies and came to 
bear significant consequences on the development of the issue. Convention had 
dictated that policies related to social welfare would apply only to those who 
resided in Japan, thus neither the Act on Medical Care for Atomic Bomb 
Hibakusha nor the Act on Special Measures for Atomic Bomb Hibakusha 
included the nationality clause. Because of this, these two pieces of legislation 
became an important instrument for the hibakusha who resided outside Japanese 
territory when demanding compensation from the Japanese government. In 
particular, the survivors who resided in Korea induced a critical turning point 
for the development of relief measures in Japan.
After the signing of the Korea-Japan Normalization Treaty, Zainichi Korean 
groups and anti-nuclear advocate groups in Hiroshima began acknowledging 
the existence of atomic bomb survivors residing in Korea and called for the 
establishment of a support group to help the Korean victims. Following these 
developments, the Korea Atomic Bombs Victim Support Association (predecessor 
of KABVA) was established in 1968, and they began sending out appeals to 
plead their cases not only to the Korean government, but also to the Japanese 
and US embassies in Korea. From the late 1960s to the early 1970s, there was a 
movement among the survivors residing in Pusan that they should go to Japan 
to receive medical treatment, even if it meant that some of them must enter the 
country illegally. In particular, Son Chin-du’s illegal entry into Japan and his 
filing of a lawsuit against the Japanese government for the issuance of 
Hibakusha Techō in the early 1970s was critical. The case exposed the limitations 
of the Japanese government’s relief measures, which were strictly restricted to its 
residents. In 1978, Japan’s Supreme Court ordered the government to issue a 
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Hibakusha Techō to Son Chin-du, reversing the earlier interpretation of the two 
legislations. The court claimed that the two laws included stipulations for 
government compensation to the hibakusha, rather than merely a guarantee of 
medical or social welfare. Therefore, the ruling concluded that, regardless of the 
person’s nationality or area of residency, if one can prove that he or she was 
indeed the survivor of the atomic bombing, they would be eligible for a 
Hibakusha Techō. For a while, the ruling of the Son Chin-du case seemed to 
pave the way for the non-Japanese victims to receive relief measures from the 
Japanese government, regardless of their countries of residency. 
Despite this Supreme Court ruling, however, the government made explicit 
efforts to trivialize the meaning of the phrase “attributes of government 
compensation” that appeared in the verdict. First, the Ministry of Health and 
Welfare issued circular note No. 402, which stated that, in order for those who 
are issued the Hibakusha Techō to be eligible for medical care and benefits, the 
person must be residing within Japanese territory. Furthermore, in response to 
the Japanese people’s demand to upgrade relief measures from social welfare to 
government compensation, the government defended its position by claiming 
that the Supreme Court’s decision did not presuppose Japan’s war responsibility. 
Rather, they claimed, the Japanese government, as the only nation to have 
suffered nuclear attacks, has the responsibility to aid those “who have suffered 
unprecedented injuries and damages, and the degree of assistance provided 
must be determined in balance with those who are also suffering from the 
consequences of other conventional warfare” (Hiroshima-ken 2011). Simply put, 
at the core of Japan’s relief policies towards the atomic bomb hibakusha lay the 
idea of acceptance—that damages caused by regular warfare must simply be 
endured—and a balancing of compensatory measures between other citizens 
who had also been exposed to wartime destruction.
Despite these measures, some Korean survivors who could not receive 
compensation from the Korean government or find a way to receive the necessary 
treatments began searching for a way to go to Japan and acquire the Hibakusha 
Techō as a temporary solution. In the early 1980s, the two governments launched 
a joint effort to establish a system in Japan to provide medical care for the 
Korean hibakusha. For Korean survivors around this time period, the Hibakusha 
Techō was not only a symbolic instrument through which to make their 
sufferings known to Japanese society, but it was also the only way to receive 
medical treatment for their physical conditions.
In the early 2000s, a lawsuit filed by Kwak Kwi-hun provided another critical 
turning point to Japan’s relief policies for the Korean hibakusha. This lawsuit 
highlighted the issue of circular note No. 402, which limited the validity of the 
110  OH Eun Jeong
Hibakusha Techō only to those in Japanese territory, a claim that Osaka District 
Court had recognized as illegal. But even after the court recognized the illegality 
of the No. 402 note in 2002, the Ministry of Health and Welfare continued to 
abide by their original position that the application and issuance processes of 
Hibakusha Techō must be conducted within Japanese territory, imposing a 
limitation on those who were unable to go to Japan due to their physical 
condition or advanced age. As of 2012, there were a number of pending cases 
regarding the discriminatory practices against overseas hibakusha by failing to 
provide necessary medical care and benefits for the treatment of atomic bomb-
related conditions.
The court ruling that entitled all Hibakusha Techō holders, regardless of the 
country of residency, to the benefits prescribed in the Act on Relief for Atomic 
Bomb Hibakusha seems to guarantee the extraterritorial application of the law. 
In reality, however, it became clear that the logic of bureaucratic procedure and 
rationalization was contained within its own rules, comprised of the nation-
state’s inner rationale and boundaries, highlighting Japan’s efforts to maintain 
territorial boundary. In other words, extraterritorial application of the relief 
policies must be contextualized as one of Japan’s reterritorialization processes. 
And this mechanism is created and maintained through the bureaucratic 
administrative system, as well as through the nationalized sense of victimization 
as “the only country to have suffered atomic bombs,” an identity that has 
become one of the cornerstones of postwar Japanese nationalism. Building upon 
this, the next section will evaluate how the delayed extraterritorial application 
and bureaucratic restriction of the Relief Act relate to the process of attaining 
Hibakusha Techō among the Korean survivors. 
Writing out Memories on Temporal-Spatial Coordinates of 
Application Forms 
When carrying out a policy, prescribing a clear-cut legal definition of the would-
be beneficiaries of the policy is not simply a rhetorical or conceptual task set up to 
describe a specific collective group (Gieryn 1983, 792). By authorizing legal 
entitlement, such procedure substantiates and legitimatizes a disproportionate 
distribution of resources between those who receive government aid and those 
who do not (Lynch 2004, 165). By granting a certain term or title to the 
members of a categorized group, the authority assigns related rights and duties 
while guaranteeing decisive benefits; at the same time, this practice is 
accompanied by controlling eligibility through a structured network built upon 
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rigorously-regulated qualifying mechanisms and an administrative screening 
process (Lynch 2004, 166). Through this course of development, the hibakusha, 
who demanded government compensation, become the subject of relief policies, 
and the state, having the power to structure and control government resources, 
becomes the dominant actor. 
When the Medical Care Act was enacted, the screening process relied on 
administrative records (victim certificates) that proved the person’s presence in 
the bombed area, written and verbal verifications from government institutions 
and officials, as well as personal testimonies. While these methods underwent 
minor changes over time, documenting official records and witnesses, as well as 
their own memories of experience, remained the most fundamental aspect of 
the process. The scientific diagnosis was insufficient at that time because of the 
uncertainties regarding the impact of radiation exposure. Unless the person had 
visible, physical injuries, it was impossible to provide biologically or medically 
meaningful standards to classify a hibakusha. In that sense, the ruling of 
Nagasaki District Court in September 2012 was symbolic by ordering the 
government to grant plaintiff Chang Yŏng-jun a Hibakusha Techō based solely 
on his own testimonies—despite the fact that he was unable to provide official 
records or witnesses. This ruling, ordered sixty-eight years after the atomic 
bomb attacks, illustrates how the issuing of Hibakusha Techō had been constrained 
by bureaucratic red tape (Todeschini 1999). This red tape consisted of the 
victim’s need to fulfill the necessary requirements—finding domestically-
produced official records and the witnesses who had access to those records, as 
well as documenting and proving these experiences. And this “bureaucratic rite 
of passing” (Kravel-Tovi 2012) began with the application form. 
The application form of Hibakusha Techō, like any other official document, 
is stylized in accordance with a specific format and guidelines. Filling out the 
application documents becomes a process of conversion or reclamation during 
which the victim evokes past experiences and directs them to a specific narrative. 
As one victim aptly put it, writing the application resembles writing a novel, and 
it requires an enormous amount of information. The applicants are required to 
provide not only the facts that can be found in the census register, including the 
details of family members and their address in Japan, but also the circumstances 
of the bombing—whom they were with, whether they were outside or inside a 
building, if there were shielding objects surrounding them, the characteristics of 
those objects, the places where they sought shelter or where they settled in the 
city afterwards, and so forth.
In 2003, the Korean Red Cross (KRC) Special Welfare Services was entrusted 
with the application procedures for Hibakusha Techō by the Japanese government, 
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and ever since, all official paperwork has been carried out via the KRC. In many 
cases, those who are knowledgeable about these processes help the applicants at 
local KABVA branches. It is not common for a researcher to assist them in 
filling out the application forms. Yet during my interviews with the survivor, or 
when I encountered Korean victims who had come to Hiroshima to apply for 
the Hibakusha Techō, I found myself more informed about the circumstances of 
the day the bombing occurred. On several occasions, they explained their 
experiences and provided related information for filling out the necessary 
forms. During these oral, autobiographical interviews, I imparted information 
and confirmed some of the details of their stories, such as the towns they 
resided in Japan, surrounding buildings, and important spatial locations. They 
attempted to scrape up the memories of the distant past for the “bureaucratic 
rite of passing” which required the victims to objectively describe what happened 
on that day. What I collected during my field research—a variety of testimonies, 
written notes, videos, transcripts, remaining monuments in Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki—became helpful in rearranging those memories that had become too 
vague or ambiguous over the years. This rather unusual relationship between 
the hibakusha and myself shows how constrained the application process was 
for the Korean victims and it was not simply due to language barriers. 
Writing the application form for the Hibakusha Techō is a process of 
rearranging one’s own memories or what he or she has been told by parents or 
relatives regarding the circumstances of the bombing, in order to fit them into 
the appropriate framework. Unlike in Korea, in Japan large amounts of 
information have been accumulated regarding the damage caused by the atomic 
bombings. This information is circulated in the form of visual and written 
reconstructions of Hiroshima and Nagasaki’s landscape, as well as biomedical 
and legal records. Individual experiences and memories are (re)constructed by 
referring to or complying with the visual and written sources or legal, medical, 
and institutional discourses produced within the society. Manuals for the 
Measures for Atomic Bombing Survivors, exhibitions at the Hiroshima Peace 
Memorial Museum, as well as annual broadcasting programs featuring the 
atomic bombing are all filled with accurate data and scientific terms regarding 
the damage caused by the explosions. Precise data on causalities, heat 
temperature, intensity, and altitudes of the explosions help the victims explain 
their physical impairments and reconstruct their memories, and their diverse 
recollections are reinterpreted in relation to that data. Many people I encountered 
in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, both victims and non-victims, were knowledgeable 
of the distance between the epicenter of the blast and where they were when the 
explosion occurred. Furthermore, many monuments in the cities show the 
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distance from the center of explosion. Annual memorial ceremonies held on 
August 6 and 9 in Hiroshima and Nagasaki are designed according to such 
concentric circles surrounding the cities. 
The atomic bombings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki have become one of the 
essential axes of Japan’s postwar nationalism, intertwined with the nationalized 
sense of victimization. Yoneyama (1999), who observed how the lives of atomic 
bomb victims intersected with Hiroshima’s urban space and political nature of 
its memories, argued that this urban spatial reenactment obfuscates Japan’s war 
responsibility and instead presents Hiroshima and Nagasaki as symbols of the 
state’s victimhood. Despite these criticisms, however, the monuments, memorial 
ceremonies, and documentary programs provide an important mnemonic 
detour for Japan’s official history, as well as for the individual hibakusha. Here, 
official history and individual memories can contradict one another, yet even 
such variances are intertwined with this detour. 
Unlike in Japan, where memories and records regarding the atomic bombs 
are linked to a nationalized sense of victimization and circulated in the public 
sphere, in Korea, they were presented only within a specific community as the 
product of private experiences. If a victim did not have an opportunity to share 
the information through the support organization or relatives, any temporal-
spatial experiences of the bombings would remain within his or her individual 
sphere. And talking about those very experiences, which were, in their words, 
“unimaginable,” “inexplicable,” and “unspeakable,” was only possible from their 
personal perspectives. If we consider the socio-cultural constraints of memories 
and records, as well as the ability to learn within a society, the Korean survivors 
rarely encounter the “official story about the bombs” on which they could 
recollect or confirm their own experiences. 
Instead, in the process of preparing the application paperwork for the 
Hibakusha Techō, the recollection of one’s memories generally takes place while 
sharing their past traumas with their family and relatives. This familial network, 
within which the victims’ personal stories and experiences are shared and 
discussed, function not only as a channel of distribution, but as a critical process 
in every step of the way toward acquiring the Hibakusha Techō. Their stories 
range from their parents’ migration to prewar Japan and their return to Korea to 
joining the KABVA and gathering information on how to attain Japan’s 
Hibakusha Techō. Some survivors in Korea, who had been completely unaware 
of the relief benefits, happened to hear about the policies at family gatherings 
and ended up applying for the Hibakusha Techō. The role of the victims’ families 
is quite significant in that, even when they themselves have no memories of 
being exposed to the atomic bombings, the testimonies written by the relatives 
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(sometimes survivors themselves) often corroborate their eligibility and in the 
end lead to successfully acquiring the Hibakusha Techō. 
On the other hand, for those who are not part of the socio-cultural network, 
the responsibility of preparing all the necessary documents falls entirely in their 
hands, reducing the chances of obtaining the Hibakusha Techō. In other words, 
the process of writing out the experiences of the atomic bombing on temporal-
spatial coordinates is restrained by the sheer lack of information on the layout of 
Hiroshima or Nagasaki, as well as the inability to supplement and corroborate 
their vague recollections. For those who were exposed to the atomic bombings 
at a young age and became orphans after returning to Korea, or the uneducated, 
mobilized laborers who worked in factories on the outskirts of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki (in Nagasaki, there were some cases in which the Koreans who worked 
in coal mines in small islands away from the city center were temporarily 
mobilized to the city for the disposal of dead bodies after the bombing), it 
becomes more difficult to write out their own experiences. Partial and 
fragmented memories are often inconsistent, and it becomes extremely 
challenging to rearrange such unorganized information on temporal-spatial 
coordinates.
As a result, those who were isolated from laborers the socio-cultural 
network—orphans, elderly females, and mobilized laborers—are least likely to 
succeed in acquiring the Hibakusha Techō. They are less likely to be informed of 
the relief measures available to them, and they lack the necessary socio-cultural 
capital to develop their memories and records into official documents. 
Mediation through Records and Experiences of the Evaluation 
Process
Once the survivors complete the application forms, they must then gather the 
official records that can prove their validity. With the enactment of the Medical 
Care Act, the Ministry of Health and Welfare designated the kind of 
documentation that would be accepted as official certificates for the exposure to 
atomic bombings: (1) victim certificates or other documents issued by 
administrative offices; (2) when (1) is unavailable, other records such as letters 
or pictures that were written or taken at the time; (3) if neither (1) nor (2) is 
available, other certificates issued by the Hiroshima and Nagasaki governors 
(Hibakusha Engo Hōrei Kenkyūkai 2003, 200). For those who do not have any 
of these documents, the government allowed two or more bystanders’ 
testimonies (excluding those written by relatives beyond a third degree of 
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kinship) to be submitted as substitutes. In addition, the government added a 
clause that permitted “other victims’ certificates, statements of facts or written 
pledges to be submitted as substitutes” when none of the above records exist.
However, this method of adopting records produced in Japan as proof of 
exposure to the atomic bombings became a disadvantage for those who 
returned to Korea after the war. While sorting out family properties and taking 
care of surviving relatives in order to return home in the aftermath of the 
bombings, few Korean survivors obtained official documents or certificates 
issued by local governments or public authorities. Instead, in most cases, the 
Korean applicants submitted residency certificates that could prove that they 
were living in Hiroshima or Nagasaki when the bombings occurred. For 
example, Yang Chŏm-i, who was exposed to the bomb in Hiroshima but “had 
no idea what an atomic bomb was,” met a person from Kure2 who told her about 
the Hibakusha Techō ten years ago. When she lived in Hiroshima, she worked at 
the Postal Savings Bureau after graduating from a secondary school. When she 
applied for Hibakusha Techō, her name was found on the old staff list. Even 
though the list was not an officially-issued victim certificate, it was considered a 
quasi-official record produced in Japan. In other cases, sealed identification 
pictures for mobilized laborers, driver’s licenses, and report cards have also been 
recognized as certificates of the victims’ residency in Hiroshima or Nagasaki at 
the time of the bombings. 
Needless to say, only those who were affiliated with public institutions as 
laborers or students during the wartime in Hiroshima or Nagasaki would have 
access to documents like victim certificates, work records, or authoritative lists 
of victims. At that time, however, the unemployment rate was high among 
Koreans in Japan, and most of them worked as daily laborers in construction or 
were self-employed in their own small businesses (Kim Kwang-yŏl 2010, 236). 
Considering that the majority of Koreans living in Japan at the time were low-
class laborers, it was highly likely that many of them did not have any official 
certificates issued by public institutions.
Despite the fact that those records are the most important way to certify 
their experiences as hibakusha, in reality, few Korean victims possess individual 
records. Instead, the victim’s or family members’ birth and death records that 
appear on census registers become critical in confirming their whereabouts at 
the time of the bombings. 
Yet the census registers were also often inadequate. At that time, it was the 
2. Coastal city located east of Hiroshima City, it held strategic importance for Imperial Navy 
during the war.
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individuals’ responsibility to file any changes made to the register, such as births, 
deaths, or changes of address, and in most cases it was the responsibility of the 
head of the family (or other male family member) to report them to the 
authorities (Yang Hyunah 2000; Im Kyŏng-t’aek 2012). Filing of the official 
records in a prompt and accurate manner was not an easy task. There were 
several instances in which the head of the household was killed in bombing 
raids, and parents were unable to register the birth of their child in the turmoil 
of the war. In addition, the census register stored at the municipal office in 
Korea was burned down during the Korean War.3 
Simply put, even if they had managed to obtain official certificates that 
proved their residencies in Hiroshima or Nagasaki, the upheaval of the Korean 
War made the survival of those documents extremely unlikely. The “triple 
afflictions”—the atomic bombing, Korean War, and neglect—(Ichiba 2003) that 
the Korean survivors endured are ingrained in the individuals’ experiences of 
preserving these official records.
After a screening process, the issuing of Hibakusha Techō is completed with a 
stamp of the local governor’s seal. This concluding point represents not only the 
government’s exercise of power as the issuer of the techō, but also the 
incorporation of Korean hibakusha into Japan’s relief policy system. In particular, 
during the complex screening process, which goes side by side with bureaucratic 
indifference (Herzfeld 1992), the Korean survivors re-encounter the Japanese 
government, the agent of colonial rule in the past.
Drawing upon bureaucratic regulations that attach more importance to 
documents and evidence than face-to-face interviews in evaluating the potential 
beneficiaries, a local authority refused the issuance of Hibakusha Techō to an 
applicant who was unable to provide sufficient evidence, such as a census 
register, government certificates, or witnesses, even though the applicant 
claimed, “If I was lying, I could not have told that many details about Nagasaki.” 
Such statements symbolize the unintended consequences of a bureaucratic 
practice mediated by documents. The complexity of the screening process 
mediated by documents and records, coupled with feelings of contrition and 
anguish toward the former colonial ruler, breeds convoluted sentiments among 
the Korean victims. Yet as they wait for the result, which revolves around 
bureaucratic indifference and interviews, these sentiments cannot help but turn 
into unfocused tension. Their personal feelings toward Japan impose absolutely 
3. The records of a Japan-born Korean resident, even if filed in Japan, were sent over to the place of 
origin, the hometown of his or her father in Korea, to be registered. A significant number of 
census registers kept in Hapch’ŏn area were lost when the town was burnt down during the Korean 
War.
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no impact on such administrative-bureaucratic procedures, and the Korean 
victims’ reunion with their former colonial ruler is inundated only with the 
anxiety that they may not be eligible to receive government benefits. The 
outcome of the screening process is structured to allow the systematic exclusion 
of those who are relatively more deprived of bureaucratically-appropriate 
records and evidence. These mechanisms of exclusion operate most 
disadvantageously to those who were most severely injured by the atomic 
bombing, those who were excluded from familial networks after returning to 
Korea, and the mobilized laborers whose residency cannot be proven by the 
census registers. 
However, the paradox that emerged during the operation of relief measures 
for the survivor is not necessarily the result of the government’s or the 
bureaucracy’s ill intension but stems from the contradiction and ambivalence 
intrinsic to the process of policy implementation and bureaucratic governance. 
Hull’s (2008, 2012) works have focused on document-based bureaucratic 
governance and semiotic technologies of modern states. Semiotic technologies 
are both symbolic and physical instruments to produce, interpret, and control 
the meanings for a specific purpose or goal. These studies also show that 
governance grounded upon documents, as well as semiotic presentations that 
rely on physical documents and records, inherently presuppose the purpose of 
control, and these interests can conflict with those of others. While authorized 
records that exist in the form of documents—regardless of the accuracy of the 
information—become powerful facts within the bureaucratic system, the 
victims’ experiences, if they are not recognized as “official records” in written 
form, have no such claim. The power embedded in official documents and 
records invites the fraud and manipulation ubiquitous in modern society, such 
as paper patients and fake beneficiaries of social welfare, forged registration, and 
forgery of official and unofficial documents. On the other hand, however, this 
supremacy of documents perpetually marginalizes those who are unable to 
obtain them. While states have come to establish these control measures in 
order to increase the veracity of the conditions, the system contains in itself an 
ambivalence that is biased against those without “official documents” (Hull 
2008, 503). 
Personal Guides for the Application Process
There are several ways for the Korean survivor to receive the Hibakusha Techō. 
The applicants may apply through the agency service at the KRC or they may go 
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to Japan and apply directly by themselves. However, before the KRC’s Special 
Welfare Services was entrusted with handling these cases, and even today, the 
most popular method is to be guided through the process with someone “who 
knows their way around” and “has the know-how.” Ever since it was left up to 
individuals to apply for the Hibakusha Techō, the survivor without special skills 
or family connections in Japan relied on personal guides during the application 
process. Even today, there are advantages to this method, compared to applying 
through the KRC.
One of the reasons that Korean survivors choose to apply directly, rather 
than applying through Special Welfare Services, is to reduce the processing time. 
It takes at least six months to a year, or in some cases up to two years, for the 
applicants to complete the bureaucratic procedures alone (for cases applied 
during the 2003-2009 period). What is called “bureaucratic time” (Hoag 2011, 
86) applies equally to the Korean survivors.4 They have virtually no way of 
knowing how their evaluations are proceeding in Japan; the applicants must 
wait to find out if they are eligible. In fact, there are a few cases in which 
applicants passed away while they were waiting for the results. This slow pace is 
often criticized as one of the means to delay the procedure and keep government 
expenditures to a minimum. On the other hand, if they apply directly in Japan 
with the help of a personal guide, it takes only about a week for the result to 
come out. The financial burden falls on the applicants, yet it can reduce a 
significant amount of time and uncertainty, largely mitigating the survivor’s 
frustration and impatience.
Yet the reduction of time is not the only reason that the Korean survivors 
prefer applying with help from a personal guide. As mentioned above, 
paperwork and preparing for interviews are not straightforward tasks for those 
who are unaccustomed to these bureaucratic procedures. Yet the process can 
become streamlined if one obtains assistance from someone who has gone 
through them before. The personal guides are usually quite knowledgeable 
when it comes to the conditions of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the kind of 
stories that need to be written down on the application forms. They are well-
informed of other steps as well, such as where to obtain the required official 
documents or what kinds of answers are appropriate to give during the interviews. 
4. Hoag (2011) pointed out that, while it is a critical operating principle for bureaucracy, 
“bureaucratic time” is also an important resource for the bureaucrats to maneuver in establishing a 
relationship with its customer, i.e. the citizens. For instance, by delaying the administrative 
procedures in issuing a re-entry permit, the bureaucracy can impose uncertainty on the person’s 
future. During this process, excessive and repetitive delays could instigate an abandonment of the 
request or function as an unspoken incentive for bribes.
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They also translate crucial components of the paperwork into Japanese before 
the evaluation, check all the necessary information required during the screening 
process, and make travel arrangements for the flight, accommodation, and food. 
They are fluent in Japanese, know Hiroshima well, and they have accumulated 
the tacit knowledge from having gone through similar procedures repeatedly. 
Especially before 2003, Korean survivors who wished to apply for the Hibakusha 
Techō had to go to Japan and undergo the bureaucratic procedures at their own 
expense. Unless the applicant was fluent enough in Japanese to prepare these 
documents, make travel arrangements, and inform him/herself of the details of 
Japan’s bureaucratic systems and evaluation process, it became necessary to seek 
out help from acquaintances, relatives, or civic groups in Japan. The fact that, 
almost without exception, these Korean guides were born in the 1920s-’30s and 
received elementary or secondary education in Japan signifies the importance of 
socio-cultural capital in the process of acquiring the Hibakusha Techō. At the 
beginning of my field research, I was quite skeptical about this aspect, yet such 
misgiving gradually abated as I observed the complexity of the procedures. 
Some personal guides receive small, unofficial fees for the services they provide, 
but as I came to find out, the fees were negligible, considering the government 
benefits and medical care provided for the members of KABVA, which they 
would receive after successfully acquiring the Hibakusha Techō. 
However, rather than working with personal guides for whom the applicants 
themselves must bear the financial and transaction costs, many Korean survivors 
rely on the support of civic groups in Japan. The Association of Citizens for 
Supporting South Korean Atomic Bomb Victims (Kankoku no Genbaku Higaisha 
o Kyūensuru Shimin no Kai, so-called Shiminkai) and Citizens Alliance for 
Hibakusha in South Korea (Zai-Kan Hibakusha Mondai Shimin Kaigi, so-called 
Shimin Kaigi) have long worked with the survivors in Korea, supporting a variety 
of legal pledges. Some of the members of these civic groups actively take charge 
by helping those without the Hibakusha Techō acquire them. As Japanese 
citizens, most of them have a deep understanding of the Korean atomic bomb 
survivor issue and have accumulated tacit knowledge regarding the atomic 
bombings and the administrative procedures related to the screening processes. 
All the financial costs of the application process are covered by donations raised 
by these groups. 
In the process of acquiring the Hibakusha Techō, these civic groups in Japan 
assume a great significance. Their support activities constitute an effort to 
understand the Korean hibakusha’s anguish through their personal interaction, 
as they rediscover the memories of the past and uncover forgotten records. 
Needless to say, these efforts are not free from the limitations inherent in the 
120  OH Eun Jeong
administrative-bureaucratic control mechanisms. Even so, such practices must 
be understood as a process of evoking records and memories that were buried 
within the history of inhumane crimes from colonial rule, the waging of war, 
and forced mobilization, to the dropping of atomic bombs that targeted civilian 
areas and the historical wrongdoings of the US, Japan, and Korea, who neglected 
their own peoples’ sufferings. 
It is significant that those who support the Korean survivor are not Korean 
civic groups or government institutions, but Japanese citizens whose sense of 
indebtedness derives from the remorse that their own nation instigated the war 
and imposed colonial rule. By responding to the suffering of the Korean 
survivor, Japan’s civil society established a sense of solidarity with their Korean 
counterpart. Such reciprocation is closely related to the shock of re-encountering 
Japan’s former colonial subjects, who had long disappeared from postwar Japan’s 
national discourse, a discourse that focused on Japan as the “the only country to 
have suffered atomic bombs” and viewed the hibakusha as symbolic cornerstone 
of peace. Japan’s self-awareness as the world’s only atomic bombing victim is one 
of the most widely used tropes of mainstream nationalism, which seeks to 
obfuscate the responsibility of its colonial rule and warfare. At the same time, 
however, such one-sided rhetoric bred self-awareness of the internal 
contradiction within Japanese civil society, and it came to function as a critical 
factor in response to the pleas from the Korean survivors. In that sense, from a 
political-sociological perspective, Japan’s postwar discourse contains in itself 
both ambivalent and paradoxical aspects.5 
Conclusion 
For Koreans applying for the Hibakusha Techō, Japan’s state authority, usually 
nothing more than an abstract concept, becomes increasingly real as their 
experiences are carefully scrutinized through documents and interviews. 
During this process, the Japanese government holds a monopolistic authority as 
the issuer of the Hibakusha Techō while evaluating the authenticity of the 
5. Several studies have suggested that by promoting history reconciliation between Korea and 
Japan, it is possible to incorporate the importance of interpersonal, cultural exchanges founded 
upon individuals’ experiences and understandings (Palmer 2013), the ability to discern the 
contradictions embedded in “victimhood nationalism” and hereditary sense of victimization (Lim 
Jie-Hyun 2012; Lim Jie-Hyun and Sakai 2003), and ultimately the “inherited responsibility” that 
derives from such consciousness (Miller and Kwak Chun-hyŏk 2009, 111-12). This case shows that 
such theoretical concepts become integrated on a practical level and set their limitations. 
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presented documents, records, and memories. As the Korean survivors await the 
verdicts, their recollections of the colonial period—during which they endured 
the “smell of the Japs [sic] (waenom)  and soy sauce”—combine with their 
memories of the atomic bombs, until they ultimately become restructured into 
the statement of the circumstances in which they present themselves as 
hibakusha. Only after completing this bureaucratic rite of passing do they gain 
the official status as Japan’s overseas hibakusha. Their distress over the years in 
Korea after losing family and returning from Japan becomes abridged into one 
certificate that records the time and place where he or she became a hibakusha, 
only to be stored away in drawers, never to be disclosed to others. 
This study sheds light on the often overlooked aspects of power and socio-
cultural context in documents-mediated bureaucratic practices through an 
ethnographical study on Korean atomic bomb survivors’ process of acquiring 
Hibakusha Techō. In the case of Korean victims, the context of authority 
underwent a continuous change throughout the postwar period. First their 
struggles were directed towards the Korean government, then to Japan, before 
becoming entwined within the post-liberation context of Korea-Japan relations. 
Furthermore, this study shows that, even though Japan’s policy measures vis-à-
vis the hibakusha were intended to aid those who survived the atomic 
bombings, when put into bureaucratic practice, they functioned in a way that 
excluded and discriminated against those who suffered the most. Because of 
this, it was highly likely that these policy measures would not be able to achieve 
its original goal of supporting the hibakusha.
This study sustains Weber’s claim that when we assume bureaucracy, as the 
basis of modern governance, functions based on instrumental rationality, it 
cannot guarantee the substantive rationality to achieve stable governance. It 
implies that policy studies should not be limited to the discourse analyses of the 
policies’ formation processes, but it is necessary to analyze bureaucratic 
practices as well as the socio-cultural customs in implementing these policies. 
Responding to Gupta’s (2012) point that anthropologists must explain why and 
how a certain bureaucratic program succeeds or fails, this study argues that it 
becomes clearer when we pay attention to who gains or loses the most from the 
way in which the bureaucratic instrument of control is structured in specific 
socio-cultural contexts. Furthermore, in understanding the governance of 
modern states, anthropologists must be more attentive to the emergence and 
development of the ambivalent and contradictory practices and effects of 
bureaucratic governance. In other words, rather than presupposing perfect 
governance and the formation of disciplined, inner panoptic monitoring, it is 
necessary to focus on the underlying deficiency, uncertainty, incompetence, and 
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possibility of failure of the bureaucratic instrument of control. Only by doing so 
can field-based empirical studies on diverse policies and their implementations 
be enriched and the process of state governance formed, altered, and reiterated 
in modern society be better understood.
• Translated by SOHN Sukeui
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